Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1974
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Courts
Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legal Remedies Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody. Supreme Court Case Files Collection. Box 25. Powell Papers. Lewis F. Powell Jr. Archives, Washington &
Lee University School of Law, Virginia.
· ~VJiH~~ 
~of Dec. 6, 1974 
Preliminary Memo 
~~' Sheet 3 
AL N~ 74 - 428 . '¢ tJt) '14 ... ~~9 
~ 
 HALIFAX LOCAL NO. 25 
Vo 
Cert. to CA 4 
(Craven, Bryan, Boreman 





Summary: See the pool memo in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 
No . 74-389 consolidated with this case. 
There is a consolidated response to both petitions. 





ALBEMARLE PAPER CO. 
v. 
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Cert. to CA 4 
{Craven, Bryan, Boreman 
dissenting in part) 
Federal/Civil 
{same as above) 
Timely 
Timely 
Summary: The case was here last term on a procedural issue. 
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., u.s. {June 17, 1974). This 
time on the merits the case presents the questions as to: (a) whether 
an award of back pay under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
was a matter of equitable discretion for the USDC or couldn't be 
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denied except in special circumstances: (b) whether a class action 
for back pay including class members who filed no prior complaint 
with the EEOC is appropriate under Title VII; and (c) whether certain 
allegedly job validated employment testing was proper under Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424. 
The action was brought in 1966 for alleged violations of Title 
VII, prohibiting discrimination in employment. In 1973, the USDC 
(Dupree) found violation of Title VII in Albemarle's seniority system 
which it enjoined but it also held that certain pre-employment testing 
was properly validated under Griggs v. Duke Power, supra, and denied 
a back pay award under § 706g. A panel of the 4th Circuit reversed 
on both grounds with Judge Craven being joined by Judge Boreman on 
the testing issue and by Judge Bryan on the back pay issue. The CA, 
with Senior Circuit Judges Boreman and Bryan voting, voted to hear 
the case en bane and oral argument was had. A tentative vote of the 
CA was to modify the judgment with regard to the back pay order. On 
certified question to this Court, it was held that Senior Circuit 
Judges couldn't vote on whether the case should be reheard en bane. 
The necessary votes not existing among active judges to rehear the 
case, the CA vacated its order to rehear the case and petrs, the 
employer and bargaining representative, sought cert here. 
Facts: Albemarle Paper Co., a North Carolina paper and pulp 
mill, practiced overt racial segregation until the mid-1960's with 
certain types of lower paying jobs being exclusively for blacks while 
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others were for whites. Because of the highly technical nature of 
the paper mill business, from the early 1950's, its jobs have been 
highly specialized with the mill being organized into departments 
and each department containing various "lines of progression" of 
related job groups. The seniority system being used in the mill 
required that all advancements be through the lines of progression 
and g enerally used as a criteria seniority in the line of progression 
r athe r than plant-wide seniority. The effect of this system was to 
perpe tuate the effect of prior discriminatory hiring practices after 
t heir abandonment in 1964 by making it difficult for blacks locked 
into lower paying lines of progression to transfer to higher paying 
lines of progression. The seniority system was incorporated into 
t he c ollective bargaining agreement between Albemarle and Halifax 
Local No. 25 of the AFL-CIO United Papermakers and . Paperworkers,the 
c o llective bargaining representative and petr in No. 74-428. The 
USDC and all three judges of the CA panel were in agreement that 
t h is seniority system violated§ 703{a) of Title VII, 42 u.s.c. 
§ 2000e-2{a), and with the consent of both petrs an order shifting 
the c ompany to a time in plant seniority system has been entered. 
Because of the increasingly technological nature of the paper 
mill business, the company in 1956 adopted pre-employment testing in 
order to insure that employees had the requisite intelligence to 
cope with the increasing automation of the plant. Until 1963, the 
-4-
Beta exam (designed to measure intelligence of illiterates through 
non-verbal testing) and the Bennett test (verbal) were used. In 
1963 the company continued using the Beta test but shifted to the 
Wonderlic test (verbal) and abandoned the Bennett test because of 
inadequate data as to its effectiveness. Employment applicants 
are required to score a certain minimum on each test in order to 
enter 8 of the Company's 11 departments and 14 of its 17 lines of 
progression. 96% of all whites and 64% of all blacks achieve the 
Company's minimum requirement on the Wonderlic test here in issue. 
In 1964, the Company prior to the passage of the Title VII began 
an extensive affirmative action program attempting to hire blacks 
who could pass ·the ·tests for its higher paying lines of progression 
and also combined certain predominately black lines of progression 
with certain predominately white lines. After this Court's narrow 
reading of § 703 (a) (2), (h) [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (h)] in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431. (1971), the Company hired an 
expert to test the validity of its tests. 
The validation procedure, conducted with the assistance of 
Purdue University, consisted of having employees in 10 job groups 
in 8 out of the 14 lines of progression for which such tests were 
required take the tests. Their results were then compared to job 
evaluations of them by their supervisors, done without knowledge 
of the test scores. . The tests together proved valid for 
9 of the 10 jobs but both were individually valid for only 1 of 
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the 10 jobs. The expert based on all findings declared the tests 
conclusively validated within the EEOC guidelines [29 CFR § 1607. 
S(b) (1970)] referred to with approval in Griggs, supra, at 433-34. 
The USDC likewise found the tests valid. The CA panel reversed (2-1) 
over the dissent of Judge Bryan and ordered the USDC to enjoin use of 
the tests. 
Resps' action was brought in 1966 as a class action under 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e in 1966. In response to petrs' attempt to prevent 
certification of the class in that year and motion for summary judgment, 
resps in a filed pleading stated that they were not seeking back pay 
for class members. Five years later in 1971, resps amended their 
complaint to seek back pay for class members. The USDC denied back 
pay under the authority of§ 706(g) of Title VII [42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(k)] making the granting of such relief discretionary because (a) 
petr had in good faith attempted to comply with the changing judicial 
interpretations in the area and had never intentionally violated the 
Act; and (b) it would be inequitable to allow resps to recover this 
staggering amount given their prior representation that they would 
not seek back pay and the detrimental reliance by Albemarle and the 
Union on this representation, both in not speeding trial of the suit 
and in not gathering evidence about individual class members. The 
CA panel reversed over the dissent of Judge Boreman .equating§ 706(g) 
with the attorney fees section of Title II [42 u.s.c. § 2000a-3b] and 
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hence holding back pay must be awarded in the absence of very limited 
special circumstances. 
Content ions: (1) Both petrs argue that the award of back pay 
by the CA reversing the USDC was error and in conflict with other 
CA decisions. A copy of 42 u.s.c. § 2000e-5g, [§ 706 (g)], is 
a t t ached . 
Section 706(g) expressly provides that the USDC upon finding a 
violation " may order such affirmative relief as may be appropriate 
which may i nclude • • • reinstatement with or without back pay." 
This Court recognized in dicta in Curtis v. Loether, u.s. 
(1974) "that the decision whether to award back pay is committed to 
the di!?cret ion of the trial judge [in Title VII actions]." All 
oth er c o urts to directly pass on the question of back pay orders 
u nd e r T itle VII have applied the traditional equitable discretion 
standard o n review of the trial judge's denial of back pay. See 
~ Manning v. International Union, 466 F.2d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 
1 972) cert. denied 410 U.S. 946 (1973); Schaeffer v. Yellow Cabs, 
462 F.2d 1002, 1006 (9th Cir. 1972); U.S. v. N.L. Industries, 479 
F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973). Kober v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 480 
F . 2d 240 , 246-47 (3rd Cir. 1973) expressly rejects the rationale 
of this opinion and adopts the reasoning of Judge Boreman's dissent. 
There is simply no support from policy, legislative history, 
or judicial decisions for extending the special circumstances rule 
of Title II attorney fees (Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 
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U.S. 400} to Title VII back pay awards. If neither the good faith 
of the defendants nor the inequitable conduct of the plaintiffs 
are factors to be taken into account when denying back pay awards, 
as t he CA states, there is no trial court discretion and the CA 
panel has unilaterally amended the statute to reverse Senate 
Amendment No. 656 to Title VII [!lOth Cong. Rec. 12381-85 (June 5, 
1964}] which changed t he provisions of the original bill providing 
for a manditory back pay award into a discretionary remedy. Further, 
petr Albemarle argues t hat a FRCP Rule 23 class action cannot be 
maintained . for back pay whe re some members of the class have not 
filed complaints with t he EEOC since this is inherently in conflict 
with the purpose of the Ac t r equiring exhaustion of EEOC remedies. 
The Union renews these a rguments in addition to concluding _ 
from a study of the history of Title VII that it was intended to 
work through mediation and administrative action and not windfall 
judicial awards. It points out nhat the ruinous monetary award 
which will be imposed on unions as a result of the judicial co-
conspirator theory under Title VII together with a per se rule on 
back pay awards may well destroy unions such as itself and argues 
that the traditional discretion rule of back pay awards under the 
• 
NLRA ought to be applied. It concludes that the schtm within the 
4th Circuit ought to be resolved by this Court. 
The CA decision, relying on cases upholding trial court back 
pay awards, states that while discretion is present in making such 
·' 
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awards, it necessarily must be exercised in light of the purposes of 
Title VII~Since the purpose of this portion of Title VII js to 
restore what has been taken by discrimination, back pay should be 
awarded unless special circumstances are present. Newman v. Piggie 
Park Enterprises, supra. Neither a tardy request for such relief nor 
good faith on the part of the defendant is such a circumstance. The 
dissenter's arguments reflect those of petrs. 
Resp argues that there is no conflict with cases such as Kober, 
notwithstanding the rejection of this holding therein, since such 
cases are female discrimination cases where the discrimination was 
caused by obligatory women protection statutes. This would clearly 
be a special circumstance under the rule in this case. Further, 
substantial authority exists in favor of the special circumstances 
rule and it has been expressly adopted in the 5th, 6th, and 7th 
Circuits. [Citations collected in Resp. at 9, n.l2]. The legislative 
history of§ 706(g) shows that the discretion referred to therein is 
to design the most complete compensatory remedy possible. All the 
CA majority did was require the USDC to exercise his discretion in 
light of this statutory purpose. The good faith of the employer is 
not controlling in a Title VII case (Griggs, supra, at 432) and petr 
was not prejudiced by tardy assertion of the back pay claim since 
defences to back pay are the same as those to injun~tive relief and 
over one-half of the plaintiff class filed individual back pay claims 
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prior to trial. Finally the notes to Rule 23 indicate that its 
use in civil rights actions was contemplated and many cases have 
upheld such back pay class actions and stated that exhaustion of 
EEOC remedy need only be as to the subject matter of the suit. 
[Citations collected in Resp. at 14]. 
(2) The Company {but not the Union) argues that the portion 
o f t he CA op i nion invalidating the Beta and Wonderlic tests is 
. 
e rror . Griggs placed the burden on petr to prove the validity of 
h i s t ests. He did validate the tests through use of an expert and 
s howed a strong positive correlation between the tests and job 
performance and t he USDC concluded that he had shown that the tests 
were ~ecessary for safe operation of the plant and hence within 
the 4 2 U.S .C . § 2000e-2(h) exception to Title VII. Although he 
didn 't use specific criteria for supervisor ratings and instead 
me re ly secured a general supervisor rating, mechanistic adherence 
t o EEOC guidelines is not required. It is impossible mathematically 
t o have a perfect validation or a perfectly correlated test. If 
Griggs is other than a blanket prohibition of testing, the reasonable 
correlation shown here ought to suffice. Further, the CA decision 
was clearly error in as much as it directs an injunction against 
petr rather than allowing him to correct any deficiencies in the 
validation. The dissenter, Judge Bryan, and the USDC make the 
same points. 
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The CA majority focus on the following alleged defjciencies in 
the testing: no objective criteria for supervisor ratings; limited 
correlation of tests with performance; limited testing (since 6 of 
the 14 departments where tests were required were not validated) 
combined with failure to show work between departments related; no 
proof that statistical error not present since lower scorers may 
disproportionately improve skills after getting the job. Resp 
repeats these arguments in addition to noting that after proper 
validation is conducted, petr may seek to get the injunction 
against testing li.FTE.D • 
Discussion: The first issue appears to be whether back pay 
awards are to be a matter of equitable discretion or whether they 
should be granted except in very limited special circumstances 
such as discrimination -compelled by state law. A number of cases, 
of which Kober is typical, articulate an equitable discretion 
standard while a number of CA decisions articulate the special 
circumstances rule. The "equitable discretion" cases virtually 
all deal with sex discrimination colorably compelled by state 
female protection statutes. Most of the "special circumstance" 
decisions are merely in the context of upholding a USDC award. 
The language in the cases is in direct conflict but the facts are 
somewhat distinguishable. 
On the merits, I think it does take a "special circumstance" 
rule to reverse the USDC's denial of back pay so that the issue 
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is squarely presented. The legislative history is ambiguous and 
policy factors weigh in either direction on the question of 
whether a special circumstances test is the appropriate one. The 
issue may well be a certworthy one unless the Court desires to 
await a more direct conflict. 
There is some logic to petrs' class action argument but no 
case law support that I could locate and several directly contrary 
CA decisions. 
The testing argument appears to be a factual one. However, it 
does raise the interesting question of what degree of validation 
must exist and what procedures for validation must be used for 
valid :testing. Decisions in the area are ad hoc and the issue 
presents no reason to grant cert although it might profitably be 
considered together with the back pay issue if that is deemed 
certworthy. 
There is a consolidated response to both petitions. 
11/25/74 O'Neill Ops in Pet. 
App. 61 
APPENDIX C 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(h) AND 2000e-5(g) 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer-
( 1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any 
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, con-
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; 
or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or 
applicants for employment in any way which would 
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employ-
ment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his 
status as an employee, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 
* * * 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, 
it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to apply different standards of compensation, or 
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment 
pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a 
system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production or to employees who work in different locations, 
provided that such differences are not the result of an 
intention to discriminate because of race, ..color, religion, 
sex, or national origin, nor shall it be ·unlawful employ-




·results of any professionally developed ability test provided 
that such test, its administration or action upon the results 
is not designed, intended or use to discriminate because of 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. It shall not be 
art unlawful employment practice under this subchapter for 
any employer to differentiate upon the basis of sex in 
determining the amount of wages or compensation paid or 
to be paid to employees of such employer if such differentia-
tion is authorized by the provisions of section 206( d) of 
Title 29. 
* * * 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) 
If the court fi nds that the respondent has intentionally 
engaged in or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful em-
ployment practice charged in the complaint, the court may 
enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful em-
ployment practice, and order such affirmative action as may 
be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, 
reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without back 
pay (payable by the employer, employment agency, or labor 
organization, as the case may be, responsible for the unlaw-
ful employment practice), or any other equitable relief as 
the court deems appropriate. Back pay liability shall not 
a<;,crue from a date more than two years prior to the filing 
of a charge with the Commission. Interim earnings or 
amounts earnable with reasonable diligence by the person 
or persons discriminated against shall operate to reduce the 
back pay otherwise allowable. No order of the court shall 
require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as 
a member of a union, or the hiring, · reinstatement, or pro-
·motion of an individual as an employee, or the payment to 
him of any back pay, if such individual was refused admis-
·~ . 
App. 63 
sion, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment or 
advancement or was suspended or discharged for any rea-
son other than discrimination on account of race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin or in violation of section 
2000e-3 (a) of this ti tie. 
* * * 
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Dear Potter: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
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